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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INVERSE
CONDEMNATION OF AIRSPACE
JAMES H. RUSSELL*
The current concern for environmental protection has two sig-
nificant impacts on aviation. First, controlling or preventing ad-
verse effects of airport noise and aircraft pollution and second,
when these preventive measures fail, developing legal remedies for
the invasion of the use and enjoyment of property. In this second
area, the traditional concepts of nuisance and trespass are being
displaced by the development of the theory of inverse condemna-
tion as a method of compensation when an airport's activities
interfere with the rights of adjacent landowners. Mr. Russell
analyzes the rights of airspace ownership, the available remedies
for invasions of those rights and posits additional questions re-
quiring resolution if the concepts of real property law are to keep
pace with the growth of the technology of aviation.
p RIOR TO 1946, the legal remedies for invasions of the use
and enjoyment of land available to land owners against adja-
cent airport and aircraft operations were largely restricted to tres-
pass and nuisance law. Rights of airspace ownership were grounded
in one of several prevailing theories: (i) a landowner owned all of
the airspace "from the heavens to the depths of the earth"'; (ii) a
landowner owned all of the airspace, but was subject to a public
easement for flight; (iii) a landowner owned that amount of air-
space fixed by statute; (iv) a landowner owned airspace to the
extent that he could effectively possess it; and (v) a landowner
owned all the airspace that he could actually occupy.'
* B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University; J.D., Ohio State University; Attorney at
Law, Chicago, Illinois. The assistance of the Aviation and Aerospace Committee
of the Chicago Bar Association in preparation of this article is acknowledged.
1 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 217.
2See C. MANION, LAW OF THE AIR (1950); Anderson, Some Aspects of Air-
space Trespass, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 341 (1960).
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In 1946, however, Causby v. United States' introduced a new
concept into the law of airspace. The United States Supreme Court
in Causby stated:
[S]uperadjacent airspace is so close to the land that continuous in-
vasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think
that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim
to it and that invasions of it are in the same category as invasions
of the surface.
... the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch
it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more
conventional entry upon it ...
The Supreme Court thus recognized the principle of eminent do-
main as applied to the use of airspace and the fights of adjacent
landowners.' Causby departed from established theories of trespass/
ownership, but combined elements of trespass with those of nuis-
ance; the decision thus marked the advent of the theory of inverse
condemnation. In 1962 the Supreme Court again dealt with this
theory in the case of Griggs v. Allegheny County,' which reinforced
the Causby opinion and made clear the Court's position that the
local governmental airport authority, rather than the aircraft oper-
ators using an airport, was liable for a taking.!
Briefly stated, the term "inverse condemnation" designates a
cause of action against a governmental entity to recover the value
of real property that has been taken, even though the power of
eminent domain has not been exercised Thus, when private prop-
erty has been "taken" for a public purpose by a governmental au-
thority, and no procedure has been provided by statute to afford an
applicable or adequate remedy, the landowner, in the exercise of
his constitutional rights, may maintain an action to obtain just
compensation for the property taken.' The theory of inverse con-
demnation thus affords a legal remedy to the landowner who has
'328 U.S. 256 (1946).
'Id. at 264-65. See also R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 155 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as WRIGHT].
'WRIGHT, note 4 supra, at 156.
- 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
'J. Struck, Aviational Easements-Case Studies, THE RIGHT-OF-WAY MAGAZINE,
Oct., 1962.
"U.S. CONST. amend. V; Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656, 140 S.E. 2d 341,
346 (1965).
9 Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 655, 670, 140 S.E. 2d 341, 346 (1965).
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been substantially deprived of the right to use and enjoy the land
by governmental authority."
Cases since the 1962 Griggs decision, however, demonstrate
that the doctrines of nuisance and trespass have not been totally
nullified by inverse condemnation. Indeed, courts have often blend-
ed nuisance and trespass together into a peculiar amalgamation,
partly as a result of "the scattergun approach of the attorneys for
the plaintiffs."'1 Moreover, some courts have treated nuisance situa-
tions with trespass terminology and vice-versa. The cases since
Griggs have predicated recovery for inverse condemnation upon
proof of both physical invasion of plaintiff's land as well as sub-
stantial interference with the use and enjoyment of that land. The
theory of inverse condemnation has thus effectively absorbed the
doctrines of trespass and nuisance and, indeed, now depends upon
them for existence.
I. WHAT IS A "TAKING" OF AIRSPACE?
A. The Overflight Requirement
A "taking" of property by aircraft operation requires a physical
invasion of the airspace within the boundaries of plaintiff's prop-
erty. Batten v. United States,'2 decided by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in 1962, stands today as the primary authority for the
proposition that a physical trespass defines a "taking." The Batten
case involved noise, vibration and smoke emissions from jet air-
craft operations at a nearby military base impeding the use and
enjoyment of nearby private homes, even though there was no
physical invasion of the premises. The court observed that the legal
theory of the litigation did not involve a tort or nuisance, but
instead a taking without compensation. Plaintiffs argued that since
the actual damage in Causby was caused by noise and vibrations
resulting from vertical sound and shock waves, recovery should also
be allowed for lateral waves. The Batten court, however, denied
recovery without the direct physical invasion that had occurred in
both Causby and Griggs. The court conceded the noise, vibration
and smoke that was incidental to the operation and maintenance of
"Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Ore. 1962).
"WRIGHT, note 4 supra, at 157. See also Trippe v. Port of New York, 236
N.Y.S. 2d 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962).
12306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
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jet aircraft disturbed the peace and quiet in every neighboring
residential area, but held nevertheless, that "recovery [is to be]
uniformly denied" absent a physical invasion of the airspace."3 The
court stated:
The vibrations which caused windows and dishes to rattle, the
smoke which blows into the homes during the summer months
when the wind is from the east, and the noise which interrupts
ordinary home activities do interfere with the use and enjoyment
by the plaintiffs of their properties. Such interference is not a tak-
ing. The damages are no more than a consequence of the oper-
ations of the base and . . . may be compensated by legislative
authority, not by force of the Constitution alone."
The rationale of the dissenting opinion filed in Batten has en-
gendered criticism of the majority rule."5 In dissenting, Judge
Murrah stated:
.. the constitutional test in each case is first, whether the asserted
interest is one which the law will protect; if so, whether the inter-
ference is sufficiently direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of sufficient
magnitude to cause us to conclude that fairness and justness, as
between the State and the citizen, requires the burden imposed to
be borne by the public and not by the individual alone.
... The interference shown here was sufficiently substantial, direct
and peculiar to impose a servitude on the plaintiffs' homes, quite
as effectively as the overflights in Causby and Griggs ... I would,
therefore, hold the damages constitutionally compensable."
Subsequent cases that involved the overflight issue have never-
theless tended to follow the Batten majority." Some have applied
a "500-foot rule" of overflight, which requires that a taking involve
not only a physical trespass of the airspace, but also that the over-
flight be less than 500 feet above the surface. 8 The trespass re-
quirement has also been applied when sonic boom test flights were
Is id. at 584.
14 1d. at 585.
"See, e.g., Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540, 546 (Wash. 1964).
"s Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 587 (10th Cir. 1962).
"See, e.g., Creel v. Atlanta, 399 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1968); East Haven v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 16 (D. Conn. 1971); Schubert v. United
States, 246 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
See also, e.g., Hoyle v. Charlotte, - N.C. -, 172 S.E.2d 1 (1970) for a
recent state decision in this vein.
"Schubert v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
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conducted six to nine miles above the ground. In Bennett v. United
States," a federal district court for the Western District of Oklahoma
stated:
.. government activities which do not directly encroach on private
property are not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment, even though the consequences of such acts impair the use
of the property . . . All the flights involved in this case which
caused the sonic booms were in navigable airspace and, although
the plaintiff may have suffered because of the alleged nuisance and
some inconvenience, such nuisance and inconvenience are inci-
dental and unavoidably attendant to use of airways."0
B. Trespass and Substantial Interference: Transition
Some courts that have insisted upon the existence of a physical
invasion for a taking have recently re-examined the trespass re-
quirement."' Although unwilling to completely forsake the ma-
jority rule of Batten, courts have begun to consider more carefully
the reasons why landowners complain of aircraft overflights; and,
in this sense, the theory of inverse condemnation has turned to
nuisance law for its further development.
In 1969, the district court for the Northern District of Georgia
held that the question whether overflights constituted a taking was
a question of fact for the jury and could not be disposed of by a
motion for summary judgment. The court observed: "The ultimate
question in this case is whether the overflights have rendered
plaintiffs' property undesirable and unbearable for residential use."'"
Courts have been reluctant to abandon the simplicity of the trespass
requirement and have only diffidently suggested an alternative-
usually couched in nuisance terminology:
The gravamen of an action for the taking of an easement of flight
is the unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the
land. Actual invasions by low-flying aircraft (at frequent inter-
vals) over some part of a tract may be necessary in the present
state of the law, to trigger the right to relief."3
19266 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
"I1d. at 629-630. See also Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690 (10th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 963 (1972); Maynard v. United States, 430 F.2d
1264 (9th Cir. 1970); Neher v. United States 265 F. Supp. 210 (D. Minn. 1967).
"
1E.g., Hanover v. Morristown, 108 N.J.S. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (Super. Ct.
1969).
2 164 Ct. Cl. 473, 475 (1964).
" Scarlett v. Atlanta, 306 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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Another federal court held that substantial interference with plain-
tiff's use and enjoyment of his land was a second requirement to
that of physical invasion since an overflight, as the sole test of a
taking, would allow "claims [that] would flood the courts [and]
give rise to a ... situation that would . . . be intolerable.""4 Other
courts that have traditionally asked about trespass in actions for a
taking have also inquired, as a corollary test, about a substantial
interference with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land, in a
manner contemplated by nuisance law.25 One court held:
Under the Causby rationale, it is not necessary to show either that
the overflights interfere with an existing use of the land or that they
occur through airspace which potentially might be occupied by the
landowner: it is sufficient to show a taking if the overflights are
low enough and frequent enough merely to interfere with some
potential use of the land.'
The Fifth Circuit, however, has distinguished the above language
and decided in 1968 that while overflights, as a taking, necessarily
constituted a federal question, a district court should forbear until
it becomes apparent that plaintiff cannot obtain adequate relief in
state condemnation proceedings. 7
Some recent decisions, on the other hand, while still requiring
an overflight for a taking, have recognized the inadequacy of the
trespass doctrine for these circumstances and have allowed recovery
based on nuisance. For example, in Ferguson v. City of Keene,8
a landowner complained that the use of a warm-up apron at an
adjoining airport caused annoying noise and vibrations and con-
stituted a taking. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held "...
the plaintiff's writ and declaration failed to state a cause of action
in inverse condemnation for want of any claim of overflight, but
a cause of action in nuisance is sufficiently alleged.""9 In con-
trast, the dissent in Ferguson acknowledged that ". . . in any event
... a distinction based upon the nature of the invasion rather than
24Mock v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 473, 475 (1964) (emphasis added).
2 5 U.S. v. 3276.21 Acres of Land, 222 F. Supp. 887, 891 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
"8 See, e.g., Nestle v. Santa Monica, 10 Av. Cas. 18,238, 18,241 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1969).
2 7 Atlanta v. Donald, 111 Ga. App. 339, 346, 141 S.E. 2d 560 (Ga. Ct. App.
1965), rev'd, 221 Ga. 135, 143 S.E.2d 737 (1965).
28 Creel v. Atlanta, 399 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1968).
29238 A.2d 1 (N.H. 1968).
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the effect of it is unjustified.""0 The New Jersey decision of Hanover
v. Morristown31 balanced the equities between aircraft operations
and the rights of landowners near an airport and held that the
noise complained of was a nuisance, notwithstanding the failure of
the landowners to prove overflights in their action for a taking.
The rationale in both Causby and Griggs was that a taking oc-
curred because the landowners had lost the use of the airspace
immediately above the property to the extent it had been occupied
by the government. Even if a liberal interpretation of a trespass
theory is adopted, the weaknesses are clear. Liability and trespass
arises only when the aircraft enters the zone of airspace 'owned'
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff would have the almost impossible
task to prove the exact height and the exact passage over his land
at which the particular flight or flights occurred. In the case at bar
the proofs clearly show that not only the immediate land below the
flight is affected, but also that the neighbor to either side will fre-
quently be harassed by the same noise."
Nuisance theories have met with difficulty in some cases, however,
partly because the issuance of an injunction has been deemed
unduly burdensome to the public interest and the operation of
public airports. Plaintiff's nuisance count was dismissed in Bensen-
viUle v. Chicago,' because the court believed the:
. . . issue places the rights of the plaintiff municipalities in direct
conflict with the interests of (a) air transportation; (b) the further
development of the world's busiest airport; (c) economic progress;
and (d) the handmaiden of both, national defense."
Other courts have used different arguments in these cases, but the
results have been the same: there is little chance of obtaining an
injunction against operation of an airport that is owned or operated
by a governmental authority. ' Of course, a prospective nuisance,
31 Id. at 4.
1 Id.
3' Hanover v. Morristown, 108 N.J.S. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (Super. Ct. 1969).
3 12 Av. Cas. 17, 105 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1971).
3Id. at 17, 108. See also East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 331 F. Supp.
16 (D. Conn. 1971), upon which the court in Bensenville relied heavily.
' Thompson v. Atlanta, 219 Ga. 190, 132 S.E. 2d 188 (1963); Amherst v.
Niagara Frontier Port Authority, 242 N.Y.S. 2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Schwab v.
Burgess, 407 Pa. 531, 180 A.2d 921 (1962); Atkinson v. Dallas, 353 S.W. 2d
275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). But see Hanover v. Morristown, 108 N.J.S. 461,
261 A.2d 692 (1969); Nestle v. Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 480, 101
1973]
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such as the construction of an airport, is not to be enjoined" and
an injunction is not to prevent anticipated or speculative airport
activity.' The increasing use of inverse condemnation may partially
explain the decline in use of injunctions to curtail aircraft oper-
ation."8 Injunctive relief, however, does remain available against
owners and operators of private airports, private corporations and
in situations in which damages are not appropriate.3
C. The Thornburg-Martin Line
Some state courts early recognized the foresight of the Batten
dissent, and have fashioned a sanguine "Thornburg-Martin ap-
proach" to inverse condemnation."0 It differs from the approach
that allows compensation for a taking by overflight, recovery for
a nuisance or compensation for a taking when there is overflight-
plus-nuisance. In Thornburg v. Port of Portland," one of the spe-
cific issues considered by the Oregon Supreme Court was whether
a "noise-nuisance" could amount to a taking since most of the
flights over plaintiffs' land were not by jet planes causing the
most noise. The plaintiffs proceeded on two theories: (i) that
systematic overflights caused a nuisance and a substantial inter-
ference, which might ripen into a prescriptive right in favor of
private parties or into the taking of an easement by the govern-
Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972). A recent decision of a federal district court sitting in Vir-
ginia held that it was proper to balance the equities of operations at Washington
National Airport against those of complaining nearby residents, and the court
dismissed plaintiff's suit for relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 4
U.S.C. § 701 (1970), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1970), the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,
344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972).
36 Bowie v. County Commissioners, 271 A.2d 657 (Md. Ct. App. 1970).
3 Overhaus v. Alexander, 57 Ohio 107, 274 N.E.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1971).
38 Inglewood Resident's Prot. Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 11 Av. Cas. 17, 696 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1970); Bensenville v. Chicago, 12 Av. Cas. 17,105, 17,111 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. 1971); WRIGHT, note 4 supra, at 182. But see Jensen v. United States, 305
F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
" WRIGHT, note 4 supra, at 182; Braides v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d
464 (1948); Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582,
394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964); Barrier v. Troutman, 231 N.C. 47, 55
S.E. 2d 923 (N.C. 1949); Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, 1 N.J. 346, 61 A.2d
645 (N.J. 1948); Hanover v. Morristown, 108 N.J.S. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (Super.
Ct. 1969); Maitland v. Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74
(1949).
4 0 WRIGHT, note 4 supra, at 180.
11376 P.2d 100 (Ore. 1962).
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ment; and (ii) that systematic flights close to, but not over, the
plaintiffs' land amounted to the taking of an easement.' The gov-
ernment invoked the 500-foot rule and argued that the overflights
did not constitute a trespass. The trial court agreed and found for
the government. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed,
viewing the Batten dissent as "the better-reasoned analysis" of the
principles involved. The court deemed the Batten majority opinion
defensible only on the rationale that private rights must yield to
public convenience in appropriate cases. If the governmental ac-
tivity caused a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment
of land and constituted a taking, the Oregon Supreme Court
reasoned it was then immaterial whether the taking was trespassory
or whether it was caused by nuisance factors. The court, there-
fore, concluded that a nuisance can amount to a taking whenever
a possessor is ousted from the enjoyment of his land. Further, noise
was held to constitute a nuisance and a taking of an easement,
whether "a noise coming straight down from above" or whether
". **the noise vector may come from some direction other than
the perpendicular."' As a natural corollary to this conclusion, the
court rejected the 500-foot trespass rule. The dissent argued that
although:
the damage created by a nuisance may equal a taking of the
whole... this does not justify this court in stating that a nuisance
may constitute the taking of a possessory interest in land, as con-
templated by our constitution."
In 1964, shortly after Thornburg, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington decided Martin v. Port of Seattle,' in which there were
overflights, but also some landowners not subject to overflights
whose complaints were based strictly on noise. The court stated:
We are unable to accept the premise that recovery for interference
with the use of land should depend on anything as irrelevant as
whether the wing tip of the aircraft passes through some fraction
of an inch of the airspace directly above the plaintiff's land. The
plaintiffs are not seeking recovery for a technical trespass, but for
4 WRIGHT, note 4 supra, at 172.
43Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 106 (Ore. 1962).
" Id. at 116.
," 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1964).
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a combination of circumstances engendered by the nearby flights
which interfere with the use and enjoyment of their land."
The court deemed the Batten dissent to be more representative of
the position of the United States Supreme Court and observed that
"the problem of balancing the interests involved, public and private,
seems much the same whether a physical trespass is or is not in-
volved." 7 The court then sensibly explained Causby and Griggs
in terms of noise and vibration, rather than overflights:
Thus, in Causby, the noise which frightened the chickens ... would
presumably be equally inimical to the use of the land whether it
came from directly overhead or obliquely from flights through the
adjoining airspace of a neighbor. Again in Griggs, the loss of sleep
due to noise and vibration was stressed as an important factor in
allowing recovery, in addition to the fears engendered by the
physical passage of the aircraft above or in close proximity to the
home. The reliance placed upon the high noise level by the Su-
preme Court in both decisions, . . . strongly indicates that the
holdings are not limited to those instances where the aircraft
passes directly over the land."
The result was a square holding by a second state supreme court,
within two years of Batten, that no overflight nor direct physical
invasion of airspace over plaintiff's land is necessary to maintain
an action for a taking of land.
Other courts have acknowledged the Thornburg-Martin ration-
ale. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressed clear
agreement with Thornburg-Martin even though it decided only that
it is for a jury to determine whether jet aircraft overflights at alti-
tudes of less than 500 feet constitute a taking of an avigation ease-
ment:
We believe the better rule is that there must be a substantial inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of the property affected, in
addition to showing low, continuous, frequent flights over or in
close proximity to the plaintiff's property. The question of sub-
stantial interference is one that the trier of the facts must decide."9
The Tennessee Supreme Court has recently indicated a preference
41 Id. at 545.
" Id. at 546.
481 d. at 545.
4 9 Henthorn v. Oklahoma City, 453 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Okla. 1969).
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for the Thornburg approach,"0 and the Florida Supreme Court
seemed to favor Thornburg-Martin in holding that a nuisance or
a series of trespasses could ripen into a taking." It is unclear
whether Georgia has rejected Thornburg." The Ohio Supreme
Court has specifically required a direct, physical encroachment for
recovery, but has suggested a possible inclination toward Thorn-
burg-Martin:
. . . we think that a person's residence is a use for which he is
entitled to compensation whenever he can prove a direct and im-
mediate interference with that use.'
A later decision, however, demonstrated the unwillingness of Ohio
courts to extend the above language further. 4 A California Superior
Court acknowledged the existence of the Thornburg line in 1967,
but nevertheless held that a taking or damaging unequivocally
means a dollars-and-cents loss in real property value even though
the offensive noise level had reached ninety-five decibels. 5 The
same court, however, more recently dealt with Thornburg-Martin
in Aaron v. Los Angeles." There the court expressly denied that it
was governed by Thornburg, which it deemed "the nuisance
theory," or by Martin, deemed "the public benefit theory"; but
these disclaimers are attributable to a concern for a definite means
of damage computation, since the plaintiffs in Aaron numbered
1,500 and claimed only money damages for loss of real property
market value caused by jet air noise, instead of personal injury or
annoyance. Indeed, the rule has been stated:
... a significant depreciation in the market value of the property
as a direct result of the overflights is not only prerequisite to re-
covery of just compensation but also marks the date of taking from
"Johnson v. Greenville, 222 Tenn. 260, 435 S.W.2d 476 (1968).
" Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.2d 95 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied,
172 So.2d 597 (1965).
"Atlanta v. Donald, 111 Ga. App. 339, 141 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. Ct. App.),
rev'd, 221 Ga. 135, 143 S.E.2d 737 (1965).
53State v. Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d 154, 209 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 925 (1965).
5'State v. Akron, 5 Ohio St. 2d 47, 213 N.E.2d 353 (Ohio 1966).
Los Angeles v. Mattson, 10 Av. Cas. 17, 632 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1970).
15 1 Av. Cas. 17, 642 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1970).
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which applicable statutes of limitation commence to run and valua-
tions for damage purposes are to be measured."
The Aaron court was also disturbed by the Martin court's rejection
of the view that insubstantial damage would be considered non-
compensable, and by its holding that the slightest diminution of
property values should be compensable. 8 The same concern for
monetary damages was shared by the California Court of Appeals
in Nestle v. Santa Monica." The court there demanded that plain-
tiffs suffer diminution of property value to recover for a taking and
held that emotional distress is noncompensable."'
Yet the real significance of Aaron and Nestle lies in their repu-
diation of Batten and the overflight requirement. In applying the
"California theory," Aaron held that the noise from jet aircraft
resulted in substantial diminution of the market value of the resi-
dential property proximately located to the landing and take-off
pattern of an airport and constituted a taking or damaging of the
properties within the meaning of the California constitution.
Further, Nestle acknowledged that "[t]he signposts . .. indicate
that the California law is that expressed in Thornburg .. .and
Martin, rather than the restricted approach of Batten."'
D. Damages
The concern for damage computation in these California cases
and under Thornburg-Martin is real. Aaron, like Martin, raises a
serious question whether liability can be determined apart from the
issue of damages; even the Aaron court's thoughtful inquiry con-
cerning the nature of offensive noise" did not avoid a result of the
rules of condemnation law that have been carried over and used
to determine damages in inverse condemnation cases since Causby.
"r Boardman v. United States, 376 F.2d 895, 899 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 953 (1968). Of course, the court in Aaron v. Los Angeles, 11 Av. Cas.
17, 642 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1970) was construing the California constitution.
"Aaron v. Los Angeles, 11 Av. Cas. 17,642, 17,645 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1970).
The court in Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964), however, was
construing its own state's constitution.
11 11 Av. Cas. 18,358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
601d. at 18,363.
6 1 Id. at 18,362.
"'Aaron v. Los Angeles, 11 Av. Cas. 17,642, 17,648 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1970).
See also Nestle v. Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr.
568 (1972).
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The most enduring of these rules has been the familiar "before-
and-after" market-price property evaluation, applied to the time of
the taking."3 This rule has been recently interpreted to mean: (i)
compensable damage is not the inconvenience suffered with the
closing of a street to extend the municipal airport runway, re-
quiring residents to travel a longer route to their homes;" (ii) the
rule is applicable to the time of filing a complaint for inverse con-
demnation;' and (iil) the "highest and best use" rule is still ap-
plicable in appropriate flight easement cases." One flight easement
case held that landowners have a right to interest and a right to be
free from costs in these cases, including costs of appeal."7 The
District Court of Connecticut recently held that market value after
the taking can be determined by considering:
(1) the height of the planes over the subject property up to a
maximum of 500 feet; (2) the distance of the property from the
extended center line of the runway up to a maximum of 2,000 feet;
(3) its distance from the end of the runway up to a maximum of
25,000 feet. 8
Yet the actual extension of the loss-in-market value requirement
to airport noise cases derives as much from Thornburg, Martin
and the California opinions in Aaron and Nestle as from the en-
trenchment of that requirement in condemnation law prior to the
advent of these cases. Although these courts have demonstrated
foresight in their decisions concerning the nature of aircraft noise,
substantial interference with property rights and the overflight re-
quirement, the necessity of market-price evaluation in condemnation
cases was retained with an accommodation to the respective state
constitutions. Thus, it is still true, even in states that firmly oppose
the overflight requirement, that ". . . in inverse condemnation the
measure of recovery is injury to market value alone. '" ' Any sub-
63 Davis v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 612 (1964); Aaron v. United States,
311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Mid-States Fats and Oils Corp. v. United States,
159 Ct. Cl. 301 (1962); Johnson v. Airport Auth. of Omaha, 115 N.W.2d 426
(Neb. 1962). See also Mock v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 473 (1964); Los
Angeles v. Mattson, 10 Av. Cas. 17,632 (Ohio 1966).
6Horton v. Atlanta, 157 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).
6 Jackson Municipal Airport v. Wright, 232 So.2d 709 (Miss. 1970).
66 Mock v. United States, 164 Ct. C1. 473 (1964).
67 Oakland v. Nutter, 13 Cal. 3d 752, 92 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1970).
68 East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., Civil No. 12175 (D. Conn. 1971).
66 Martin v. Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540, 546 (Wash. 1964).
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stantial deprivation of plaintiff's practical enjoyment of his land
"must be translated factually by the jury into a reduction in the
market value of the land."'
The necessity of diminution in market value of real property,
however, seems inappropriate to cases in which substantial inter-
ference with use and enjoyment of the land, instead of the mone-
tary value of the land itself, is the gist of the action.7 This type of
lawsuit, after all, is an attempt by human beings to stop further
activity that interferes with the reasonable conduct of their normal,
everyday lives. Loss in market value is highly persuasive evidence
of substantial interference with use and enjoyment of land,7 but
an action for inverse condemnation should contemplate more than
out-of-pocket loss. It does not appear reasonable, at least, to require
proof of human hearing loss to show market value loss and thus a
compensable taking. Yet two recent cases have done so.7" Class
actions may be appropriate when the parties are too numerous to
bring before the court and when a community of interest exists
among the members of a class. Of course, the beneficial interest
of the representatives must be clearly demonstrated.'
On the other hand, relief from a widely shared annoyance such
as aircraft noise may be better considered by legislatures or ad-
ministrative agencies, which can deal with broader interests and
issues than those of particular plaintiffs before a court.' Courts
must necessarily draw a line between damages that are properly
awarded from public resources and those that people must share
with all others in the community, in return for benefits and services
derived therefrom. 6 Across-the-board compensation to all residents
7 0Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 110 (Ore. 1962).
"'Henthorn v. Oklahoma City, 453 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Okla. 1969). "The sine
qua non is the question of interference."
7'The Aaron court implies as much. 11 Av. Cas. 17,642, 17,649-50 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1970).
7' Nestle v. Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1972); Cunliffe v. County of Monroe, 63 Miss. 2d 62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
7 Greater Westchester Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d
523, 91 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Alexizos v. Metropolitan Airport
Commission, Memo No. 66891 (D. Minn. 1970). See also Virginians for Dulles
v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 575 (E.D. Va. 1972).
7 Tondel, Federal Regulation of Aircraft Noise, the Legal Rights of Airport
Neighbors, and Legal Aspects of Compatible Land Use, SAE/DOT Aircraft and
the Environment (Jan. 1971).
76 Id.
INVERSE CONDEMNATION
of an arbitrarily-determined zone of damage or interference forces
a court to perform a function for which the legislature or an ad-
ministrative agency may be better equipped."
E. Statute of Limitations
Courts have satisfactorily resolved the issue of the time of a
taking, i.e., when a taking has occurred, but from what date does
the statute of limitations begin to run? The court of claims has
developed the rule that the statute does not begin to run until the
flights produce a compensable taking, and that is often determined
by events such as a change in flight pattern," the advent of shrill,
noisy jets," the use of heavier jets,"° the use of jet afterburners"' or
upon the general principle that a taking occurs when the flights
increase to an extent that constitutes substantial interference with
the use and enjoyment of the property, joined with the realization
that the impairment will continue." These reasonable rules militate
against the requirement of trespass for a taking, even though they
also demonstrate the difficulty in isolating the time at which an
interference with the use and enjoyment of land has become of
sufficient substance to warrant constitutional dignity.8
II. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. Liability for Taking
Griggs had a significant impact in holding local governmental
airport authorities liable for a taking, rather than the airlines, the
77 Id.
" Klein v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 221 (1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 936
(1961).
71A. J. Hodges Industries, Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 592 (Ct. Cl. 1966);
Robertson v. United States, 352 F.2d 539 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Bacon v. United States,
295 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
"'Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Davis v. United
States, 295 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
, Brin v. United States, 8 Av. Cas. 17,215 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
82A. J. Hodges Industries, Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 502 (Ct. Cl. 1966);
Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Mid-States Fats and Oils
Corp. v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 301 (1962); and more recently, Hoyle v.
Caharlotte, 276 N.C. 292, 172 S.E.2d 1 (1970). See also WRIGHT, supra note 4.
But see Boardman v. United States, 376 F.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 953 (1968).
"3WRIGHT note 4 supra, at 190. But see Boardman v. United States, 376
F.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 953 (1968).
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Civil Aeronautics Administration or the federal government. The
Supreme Court looked to the local airport authority as the pro-
moter, owner and lessor of the airport and consequently, the one
who took the air easement in those circumstances. This holding
reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and contradicted other
decisions."
Griggs is still authoritative on this point, but Griggs did not
involve any question of taking under Pennsylvania state law."
Liability was imposed upon the county of Allegheny for a taking
under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution;
the dissent in Griggs argued that it was the United States that had
taken petitioner's property, since the county had designed and
planned the airport under the supervision of the Civil Aeronautics
Administrator." Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a 1971
per curiam opinion, summarily applied Griggs to the question
whether the municipal airport authority or the aircraft operator is
liable for the taking of a flight easement.87 In addition, the federal
district court of Connecticut held in mid-1971:
There is no basis for holding that defendant airlines in operating
their planes over plaintiff's property on the routes and at the alti-
tudes prescribed by federal regulations, have also taken an ease-
ment in those properties. Griggs, which involved 'a number of air-
lines' did not so hold. On the contrary, it indicated that the airlines
are not liable. No case comparable to this one has imposed liability
on commercial airlines, as far as I can discover. I conclude that
defendant airlines are not liable for a taking.88
A California Superior Court, however, denied motions for sum-
mary judgment by airlines and aircraft manufacturers against the
city of Los Angeles' cross-complaints, on the theory that the cross-
defendants were potential indemnitors of the liability to which the
84 Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.
1962); Corbett v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 166 So.2d 196 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964).
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, at 91 n.2 (Black J., dissenting).
See also Atlanta v. Donald, 221 Ga. 135, 143 S.E.2d 737 (1965); Westchester
Homeowners' Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 523, 91 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1970).
88 369 U.S. 84, 91 (Black & Frankfurter JJ., dissenting).
87State, ex rel. Bower v. Columbus, 11 Av. Cas. 18,261 (Ohio 1971).
88East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 11 Av. Cas. 18,289, 18,302-303 (D.
Conn. 1971).
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city might be subjected under state law.8" Also the First Circuit
has suggested that liability on the basis of Griggs, as between the
airport authority and the airlines, may not be mutually exclusive.
The court affirmed a conventional application of Griggs, but com-
mented:
Any involvement by the airlines in the alleged taking is derivative
from their involvement with the Port Authority. Thus, jurisdiction-
al questions aside, we will assume that if, but only if, the Port
Authority violated the law, the airlines did likewise."0
B. Zoning
Airport zoning ordinances have significantly contributed to the
growth of the modem airport, 1 and are likely to be sustained as
valid exercises of the police power as long as they are reasonable
and not arbitrary nor confiscatory in nature. 2 But when an ordi-
nance restricts the use of adjoining land to the extent of effectively
taking the private property, then it may be an unreasonable exer-
cise of the police power. In Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Com-
mission," the Indiana Supreme Court invalidated, under the Indiana
Constitution, a master airport zoning ordinance that had been
violated by the construction of a toll road within an airport's pro-
hibited inner area approach zone. The state court held that the
ordinance constituted a taking of private property by the govern-
ment for specific public use without compensation: "The [c]ity may
not under the guise of an ordinance acquire rights to private
property which it may only acquire by purchase or by the exercise
of its power of eminent domain. .. .""
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because it
appeared that the decision might affect airport zoning ordinances
in general under the fourteenth amendment. The Court, however,
held that the Indiana decision was based on an independent and
8'Greater Westchester Homeowners' Ass'n v. Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 523,
91 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1970).
9Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 444 F.2d 167, at 168 n. 5 (1st Cir.
1971), aff'g 320 F. Supp. 1317 (D. Mass. 1971).
91 WRIGHT, note 4 supra, at 192; citing Strunck, Airport Zoning and Its
Future, 50 A.B.A.J. 345 (1964).
92But see State v. Earl, 233 Ark. 348, 345 S.W.2d 20 (1961).
3 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
1 Indiana Toll Road Comm'n v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237,
242 (1963), citing Yara Eng'n v. Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945).
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adequate state ground, thereby vitiating federal jurisdiction and
necessitating a dismissal of the writ. This decision has given states
a free hand in passing upon property acquisition in airport zoning
cases.9 The Indiana court held that rights to airspace above land
were protected by the state's constitution; the Supreme Court found
nothing to the contrary in the United States Consitution. Thus,
Jankovich imparted constitutional importance to violation of air-
space rights, but only on the basis of state law.
Mississippi followed Indiana by holding that a municipality's
otherwise valid use of the zoning power to establish a clearance
easement was limited by the Mississippi Constitution. Thus, when
the police power intended to effect a height restriction in an instru-
ment approach zone, it amounted to a taking of property within
the meaning of the state constitution and compensation therefore
was required." Ohio has held that an airport zoning board's regu-
lation concerning population density and concentration, as well as
height of structures and objects in a prescribed flight corridor,
amounted to a taking of private property for public use without
compensation. The court did not mention whether the taking was
prohibited by the state or the federal constitution." Jankovich was
cited, though not reconciled by the Ohio court, but the opinion
can be read to mean that it was the prohibition in the Ohio con-
stitution against the taking that had been violated."8
The California Court of Appeals invalidated a use of the zoning
power as a taking of property adjoining a private airport when a
county, in contemplation of the acquisition of an airport, adopted
a height restriction ordinance for the property, after which the
property was rezoned to a more restrictive classification and then
made the subject of a general plan for airport development...
WRIGHT, note 4 supra, at 196.
e Jackson Municipal Airport v. Evans, 191 So.2d 126 (Miss. 1966).
9 7Hageman v. Board of Trustees, 20 Ohio App. 2d 12, 251 N.E.2d 507
(1969).
98 The conclusion of the Ohio Court of Appeals was that "There is nothing
in the state statutes that authorizes the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Joint
Airport Zoning Board to exercise powers of eminent domain." (emphasis added).
State eminent domain powers having been improperly arrogated by the airport
board, it is presumed that the plaintiff's rights that had been violated were
grounded in the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 512.
11 Peacock v. Sacramento, 271 Cal. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969).
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These actions froze development of the property, even though the
airport was never acquired by the county. This result was deemed
a taking. A zoning ordinance may be used to limit the height of
potential structures surrounding an airport to prevent general haz-
ards to air traffic, but it cannot be used to avoid compensation for
the taking of an avigation easement. If the ordinance results in
limits upon surrounding land that deprives the owners of an essen-
tial amount of airspace, then there has been a taking instead of a
valid exercise of the police power."'0
C. Prescription
Since statutes of limitation apply to flight easements in inverse
condemnation, rights in airspace may also be acquired by pre-
scription.' Prescriptive rights of flight may be acquired, and lost,
by acquiescence in the erection of an encroachment or barrier for
the statutory period.' A Florida court has defined the time of
taking as the time when jets began to land and take off frequently
from an air facility; the court held that the prescriptive rights of
an airport authority did not begin until that time, thus not barring
plaintiff's inverse condemnation action.0 8 A Kentucky court held
that a municipal airport had no prescriptive rights to a clearance
easement, ". . . for the simple reason that it has not exercised
adverse rights in the space involved for fifteen years ..
D. Eminent Domain
When the government institutes a condemnation proceeding for
the taking of only a flight clearance easement, may adjoining
landowners force the taking of an avigation easement requiring
compensation for both the clearance and flight easements? Deci-
'
00 Sneed v. Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. (1953), quoting
Justice Holmes' famous opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922). Neither may a local zoning ordinance be used to prevent the establish-
ment of an airport by a regional airport authority. Heath v. Licking County
Regional Airport, 45 Ohio Op.2d 68, 237 N.E.2d 173 (1967).
"'1Trippe v. Port of New York, 17 App. Div. 2d 472, 236 N.Y.S. 2d 312
(App. Div. 1962), rev'd, 14 N.Y.2d 119, 198 N.E.2d 585, 249 N.Y.S.2d 409
(1964).
"' Strother v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 94 Cal. 2d 525, 211 P.2d 634 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1949).
"0' Hillsborough v. Benitez, 211 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1967).
104 Shipp v. Louisville, 431 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. App. Ct. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1088 (1968).
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sions of federal courts seem to answer that question negatively,"5
but they have not restricted the state courts.'"
The New Mexico Supreme Court dismissed a municipality's
petition to condemn more property than reasonably needed for
airport extension purposes and held that the municipality could
take no greater interest than is reasonably necessary for the con-
templated public use."' A municipality may consider future air-
port traffic demands that can be fairly and reasonably anticipated
when establishing a need for the taking of private property for a
flight clearance zone." 8 Prior approval of the FAA is not necessary
to the exercise of eminent domain powers.' 0 On the other hand,
the imposition of curfews,"' noise limitations.' or other restrictions
upon the use of navigable airspace invites conflict with the United
States Constitution's supremacy clause, in addition to the state pre-
emption of regulation of air flight."' The power to acquire property
through eminent domain may be lawfully restricted by statute;"'
but a statute restricting a condemnor from acquiring further land
rights need not prohibit the acquisition of easement rights to other
land to protect land previously acquired for runways."'
III. CONCLUSION
Traditional concepts of real property law have clearly inhibited
'" United States v. 452.13 Acres of Land, 210 F. Supp. 323 (D. Fla. 1962);
Western v. McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287 (D. Md. 1962).
106 Bowling Green-Warrent County Airport v. Long, 364 S.W.2d 167 (Ky.
1962); Johnson v. Airport Authority, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d 426 (1962).
10' Carlsbad v. Ballard, 71 N.M. 397, 378 P.2d 814 (1963).
"' Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1967).
"'In re Condemnation of 10.670 Acres, 10 Av. Cas. 17,667 (Pa. C.P. 1967);
Winner v. Lineback, 192 N.W.2d 705 (S.D. 1971).
1'Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972).
101 Opinion of the Justices, 271 N.E.2d 354 (Mass. 1971).
I Stagg v. Municipal Court, No. C932070 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles, June 6,
1968). Accord, American Airlines, Inc. v. Audubon Park, 407 F.2d 1306 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969); Rosenham v. United States, 131 F.2d
932 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 790 (1943); American Airlines, Inc.
v. Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), afl'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969). But see Hanover v. Morristown, 108
N.J.S. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1969).
"' Massachusetts Port Authority v. R.S.R. Realty Co., 265 N.E.2d 860 (Mass.
1971).
"I Loschi v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 354 Mass. 53, 234 N.E.2d 901
(Mass. 1968).
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courts' responsiveness to the exponential growth of aviation. The
erosion of the overflight requirement in airport noise cases is surely
a salutary development; but this requirement, in an age of moon
landings, only symbolizes the continuing challenge that aviation
progress presents to the bench and bar. Further considerations in
this field that merit the immediate attention of the legal community
include:
(i) New definitions of human health, not limited to the mere
"absence of disease or infirmity"115;
(ii) Greater willingness of legislatures and courts to elevate
environmental protection to constitutional level, either state
or federal;1.
(iii) Judicial inquiry into the reasons for the necessity of loss
of market value of property in inverse condemnation cases;
and
(iv) Admissibility of technological evidence of noise annoyance
and interference, such as "noise exposure forecasts" and
"effective perceived noise levels.""..
Most important, it is for lawyers and judges to appreciate the im-
portance of their role in shaping the future of aviation-and to
plan accordingly.
"1 Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 575 (E.D. Va. 1972).
See, e.g., ILL. CONST. article I, in which a "healthful environment" is defined as
"that quality of physical environment which a reasonable man would select for
himself were a free choice available."
1 6 See Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 1972).
See also Indiana Toll Road v. Jankovich, 244 Ind. 574, 193 N.E.2d 237 (1963);
ILL. CONST. art. X.
""See Aaron v. Los Angeles, 11 Av. Cas. 17,642, 17,648-649 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1970).
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